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The traditional notion of information security, rooted in a solidly technical foundation, has within the past decade seen wide
criticism within academia - much of which has originated from the social sciences community - as being narrow and
technology-centric instead of holistic and organizational in its focus.  As information security awareness encompasses an
ever-greater scope of organizational dynamics, it becomes necessary for us to develop design methodologies and ultimately,
systems, capable of dealing practically with the complex and multifaceted nature of the decision-making of information
systems security which is entailed by the emerging notions of a new paradigm for security.
To this end, we present an architecture which implements a web-based multi-user decision support system (DSS) driven by
an operational security model within a qualitative multi-criteria framework that utilizes AHP as its inference engine.  The
system is then demonstrated in action, by addressing a multi-criteria security control selection decision.
Keywords
Information systems security planning, design, and management; Decision support; Multiple criteria decision making
INTRODUCTION
Recent figures suggest that losses from security breaches continue to be a major organizational concern.  Well-known polls
such as that conducted by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), published in 2002 (Power, 2002) and 2003 reported significant losses to the polled organizations due to security
incidents, with 56% of organizations surveyed reporting detected security breaches.  Moreover, PricewaterhouseCoopers
L.L.P. and Information Week, reported an estimated $1.6 trillion dollars in damage on the global economy and $266 billion
within only the United States (Cavusoglu, Mishra, Raghunathan, 2004).  Such numbers should serve to convey to us a clear
signal that security remains a continually significant issue with organizational as well as economic impacts.  This is further
evidenced in the increasing focus which information security is receiving in the legal environment (Smedinghoff, 2005).
However, security literature and theory has in the past decade come under wide criticism, as being largely technocratic (e.g.,
Willison and Backhouse, 2003) and functionalistic in its approach to information security, at the expense of the
organizational aspect (Jager 2004).  The multidimensional nature of security awareness (Siponen 2001) precludes, from this
perspective, the ability of traditional security management approaches to consider significant factors that are not easily
quantifiable, within their decision-making.  The traditional focus, represented best by the so-called “C.I.A.” paradigm of
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (Greenwald 1998), has historically been on the “Confidentiality” aspect of the triad –
the preservation of secrecy, development of increasingly sophisticated security technologies and encryption capabilities.
Proponents of organizational, behavioristic, and socio-technical orientations purport that such a focus places undue emphasis
on  the  role  of  technology  at  the  expense  of  a  wider  organizational  context  full  of  actors  who  can  and  do  influence  the
technology which becomes embedded in the organization.
Within this paper, we seek to address the viability of a re-orientation of security management decision-making along more
behavioral and organizational lines, specifically through the development of a collaborative decision support system (DSS)
for security decision-making and planning, which incorporates notions drawn from group decision making, multi-criteria
decision analysis and inquiring systems through the implementation of an multiple criteria decision making (MCDM)
framework incorporated by the authors into a distributed web application.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a brief review of relevant literature. We then present a
 3355
Fritz and El-Gayar ISSEC: A socio-technical DSS for information security planning
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th-14th 2005
description of the proposed architecture, briefly discuss our implementation, and follow with a case study demonstrating the
applicability of the proposed system in addressing concerns identified in the literature. The final section concludes the paper
with reflections and direction for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This work draws its theoretical foundation from several disparate research areas, underscoring the multidisciplinary nature of
such attempts to synthesize technical and organizational concerns into a coherent whole.  The adoption of a socio-technical
perspective towards decision-support systems (Sena and Shani, 1999) and deliberate inclusion of socio-technical design
principles  (Mumford,  1996)  into  the  architecture  of  such a  DSS is  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge an  unexplored  domain  of
research.  The following sections presents a brief review of security planning and decision making, and theoretical
contributions in inquiring systems and organizational learning, upon which this research is grounded.
Security planning and decision making
The literature identifies a severe disconnection between strategic and operational decisions (Rees, Bandhopadhay, Spafford
2003; Baskerville and Siponen, 2001) and, in consequence, an ad-hoc and reactive approach to security policy-making
(Gaskell, 2000) focused around the needs and concerns of the present moment with little regard for maintaining consistency
in security policy.  Of course, this generalization cannot be applied unilaterally; nonetheless, the distinction receives support
from empirical security assessment surveys (i.e. Whitman, 2003; Power, 2002).  This is in part due to the rapid pace of
technological innovation and consequent lag in organizational policy adaptation (Baskerville and Siponen, 2001), but we
would suggest it is symptomatic of a systematic lack of proper and efficient communication between executive and
operational personnel with respect to the security environment.
Security management has come to be regarded as largely a subset of risk management, and quantitative and mathematical
analysis approaches to security investment and management have been heavily emphasized (i.e., Kort, Haunshmied, and
Feichtinger, 1999; Courtney, 1977).  Modern techniques available to risk management are designed to work with high-level
aggregate data, which makes them often troublesome to many IT security considerations (Cavusoglu, Mishra, and
Raghunathan, 2004) which occur within the organization at the operational level.
The literature offers us some avenues of approach to the formalization of security decision-making (Baskerville, 1993) and
security management (Straub and Welke, 1998) which reach beyond the level of risk management through checklist-like
approaches and access control matrices (Lampson, 1977; Bell and LaPadula, 1976), techniques developed in the infancy of
information security and which are still in use today in modern standards like ISO 17799.  Building upon these initial
approaches which first introduced basic decision theory concepts into information security management, (El-Gayar and Fritz,
2004) extended the application of decision theory to multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) and advanced a preliminary
framework for decision support incorporating these ideas into an analysis space suitable for multidimensional security
analysis, but lacked a solid theoretical grounding for proposing a system which supported these notions.
Inquiring systems and organizational learning
Churchman’s seminal work on inquiring systems (Churchman, 1971) provides us with a comprehensive framework for
defining intelligence in systems, and thus, for valid approaches to complex problems.  Alternatives to a normative Leibnitzian
rational philosophy, which he defines as Lockean (empirical objectivity), Kantian (multi-perspective), Hegelian (dialectical
or conflict-based), and Singerian (learning through gradual discernment of cause and effect based on success of past
outcomes) are identified as useful approaches to issues which are peculiarly complex, in that their analysis requires the
consideration of ill-defined problems, heterogeneity of levels of communication, and highly context-dependent concerns
where objectivity is difficult or impossible, and reliance upon subjective judgment (at and above the “Kantian” mode of
inquiry) and thus on a posteriori as well as a priori reasoning.
We can take it for granted that each decision-maker avails himself of some amount of intelligence in regard to the
surrounding  environment,  which  he  then  uses  in  making  a  decision.   Our  ability  to  progress  beyond  this  statement  to  a
universal assumption is, however, limited a priori outside the Leibnitzian paradigm implicitly assumed by rational choice
theory (Olson, 2001).  A socio-technical view of security necessitates a boundedly rational approach (Simon, 1960) to
decision-making, given our assumption of the complex and ill-structured nature of the problem domain and our lack of
complete information.  This implies an inherent subjectivity of judgments expressed and thus a need for communication and
collaboration between conflicting perspectives, with the intent to eventually reach an agreeable consensus.
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To extend the organizational system to the Singerian mode of inquiry requires additionally the establishment of
organizational memory (Stein and Zwass, 1995) by supporting the collection and aggregation of individual knowledge that is
collaboratively accepted, (Richardson, Courtney, and Paradice, 2001) and facilitating its timely recall by some associative
process.  The facilitation of organizational learning (Senge and Sterman, 1992) requires not merely that existing knowledge,
in the form of conceptual schemas and scenarios, be available, but that such knowledge actively supports future actions, and
thus future decision-making.
MCDM and group decision support
Multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) would seem a natural technique to support the sort of organizational learning
through group collaboration (see Nunamaker, Briggs, and Mittelman 1996) identified above.  The availability, intuitive
nature, and ease of use of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique for MCDM make it an ideal candidate for this
purpose (Bryson, 1996).  Briefly, AHP is an analytic technique that utilizes pair-wise comparisons between possible
alternatives over a set of diverse criteria (Saaty, 1980).  AHP supports qualitative comparisons (Vargas, 1990) as well as
meaningful comparison given incommensurable unit measures (Hwang and Yoon, 1981).  The explicit use of pair-wise
comparisons means that trade-offs in conflicting judgments are made obvious to the decision-maker. The simplicity of user
interaction and ability to hide the implementation details of the algorithm without adversely affecting the usability of the
results increase its desirability for system implementation in this context (Vihakapirom and Li, 2003).
Group decision support through AHP is not without its difficulties, however.  Adaptations of AHP to the support of a group
decision making context have been made (Tavana, 2003; Muralidharan, Anantharaman, and Deshmukh, 2002), though a
majority of applications focus on group collaboration as the basis of input prior to the AHP process itself, or AHP as an
initial step, followed by other techniques.  However, our interest lies in the combination of separate, individual and subjective
judgments expressed as preference structures over a common set of criteria, which would be necessary to support the higher
levels of inquiry (Kantian, Hegelian, Singerian) represented above, through group interaction which occurs after the
individual (subjective and qualitative) preferences have been elicited and collected.
THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
We can now deduce a number of requirements that would define the context of a socio-technical approach to decision support
for information security, and thus justify the design of our proposed system.  We recognize as explicit the need to
accommodate multiple stakeholder perspectives, and to facilitate ‘organizational memory’ through the storage and
associative recall of previous judgments.  The system, to support Hegelian and Singerian levels of organizational inquiry
(Richardson et al., 2001), would need to incorporate means of aggregating these preferences and evaluating the outcome.
Finally, the approved outcome of the decisions made should be available to support future judgments and scenario creation.
A web-based distributed architecture seems a natural choice for such a situation.  Associative recall suggests database
technology and especially a data warehouse for archiving results permanently.  The need for preference aggregation suggests
that group dynamics will be important, and this in turn should be leveraged through social feedback-based processes
whenever possible, to accommodate disagreement and allow the expression of stakeholder opinion in the decision.  The
system will support judgments that are iterative in nature.
Figure 1 provides a high-level conceptual diagram of the system under discussion.  Our implementation focuses around three
major functional areas: Preference aggregation, Inference engine, and Knowledge association, supported by an underlying
data warehouse.  This connected set of subsystems provides the infrastructure upon which the presentation-level access (i.e.,
the user interface) is built.
Knowledge association
Our initial model for the MCDM decision framework advocated a combinatorial approach to alternative generation,
delineating a series of analysis spaces corresponding to the basic operational security notions of Asset, Threat, and Control.
This system implements that model implicitly and this is reflected in the data warehouse design schema, which in turn feeds
the inference engine.  The Knowledge association module handles the translation of these elements into the schema of the
data warehouse, generating relational links between scenarios and reusing combinations held in common between scenarios.
One of the first developments which became obvious to us in the course of system design was that the multi-criteria-based
approach undertaken in (El-Gayar and Fritz, 2004) lent itself to a scenario rather than model-based approach to decision
analysis.  Originally we had set out to develop a model-based decision support system, but experimentation led us to realize
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that a scenario-based approach allows for more detailed analysis results to be viewed on a case-by-case basis and overall, it
seemed more appropriate to the nature of the inquiring system which we were attempting to produce.
The Knowledge association module maps chosen elements and criteria to existing scenarios if possible, or creating unique
elements when necessary.  This serves to limit greatly duplication (one of the earliest problems faced in experimenting with
the initial framework using the AHP software package Expert ChoiceTM) and facilitates iterative use of the system through
the establishing of association relations, linking scenarios to one another and reusing a common base of related assets, threats
and controls.
Figure 1.  Architecture of the developed system.
Inference engine
The initial prototype of the system uses AHP as its inference engine, though the proposed system can be adapted to utilize
different MCDM methodologies as well.  Alternatives and criteria are derived through the Knowledge association module
and separate judgments are stored for each stakeholder both for criteria prioritization and alternative evaluation.  Due to the
need for the knowledge association module and tight integration with the data warehouse, we decided to implement AHP
ourselves.  We chose a normalized eigenvector approach (one of the first techniques developed by Saaty (1980) and still a
commonly preferred choice) due to its robustness, speed, and ease of implementation.
The AHP technique uses redundant pair-wise matrices, thus a given set of n inputs will require:
 (n2 –n) / 2 comparisons to be made by each stakeholder.
Thus, given an AHP scenario composed of n criteria (C1… Cn) and m alternatives (A1… Am), for each stakeholder:  There are
[(n2 –n) / 2] + [n(m2 –m) / 2] judgments required.
The exponential growth resulting quickly becomes intractable from a practical standpoint, which makes the technique applied
in this setting suitable for a relatively small number of inputs, again supporting our employment of a scenario-based approach
to the decision analysis.  This is a widely acknowledged weakness of the technique but one which can be mitigated by
informed scenario design.  We dynamically calculate judgments from the stored priorities, to allow for ease of adjustments
when performing aggregations, as well as allowing for future integration with other data sources.
Preference aggregation
Preference aggregation in this system is two-fold.  Individual preference hierarchies are combined through the assignment of
stakeholder weights w ‘democratically’ (i.e. based on m stakeholders, each stakeholder has a share of (w = 100% / m) in the
decision outcome, but support for dynamic adjustment is achieved by applying the preference weight w to the priority
associated with the preference before the preference enters the inference engine.  We chose to implement the system in this
way to allow for flexibility in the aggregation method used.  Again, a multitude of mathematical approaches have been
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postulated for group decision support, many of which aim at finding an a priori aggregate function for this summation in
terms of utility maximization.
Our focus, however, on a socio-technical approach suggested instead that stakeholder feedback should be the prime element
in  the  generation  of  consensus.   To  this  end,  we  allow  the  scenario  designer  to  ‘publish’  the  aggregate  result  and  the
stakeholders are then able to vote in support of the result or to dispute it.  Figure 2 depicts in an abstracted form the process
of aggregation used in this system.  This same technique may be applied for much more sophisticated aggregation methods
without changing the underlying group dynamics in any way.  Simple weighted sums allow for rapid feedback and which are
applied systematically through the inference engine.
Figure 2.  Stakeholder preference aggregation
Implementation details
In brief, the system uses an industry standard n-tier architecture composed of three main layers: Presentation layer
(containing server-side scripting), Business layer (containing analysis objects), and Data Access layer (abstracting from a
relational database management system (RDBMS) architecture and providing object-specific as well as general utility
methods and connection management).  Web scripting occurs in Microsoft’s ASP.NET and business objects are compiled
into .NET assemblies, supported by a dozen SQL stored procedures and a handful of views and functions, residing, with the
data warehouse star schema, in Microsoft’s SQL Server 2000.
USING THE SYSTEM
Figure 3 depicts the normal process flow for use of the implemented DSS.  This diagram also describes the major
components of the user interface, residing at the presentation layer of the web-based system.
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Figure 3.  System flow diagram
The general procedure for using the system is as follows:
1) Users examine and can add to the collection of basic elements (assets, threats, and/or controls) that are drawn upon
later in designing scenarios.
2) A user interested in creating a scenario uses the searchable knowledge base of archived scenarios, to find previous
cases that used similar elements, and may view the accepted results of the archived scenario if they are available.
3) The user may elect to derive his scenario from a previous case that he has located, or may simply begin a new
scenario.  The system provides a list of previous criteria from scenarios of the same type, or allows creating unique
criteria for this instance.
4) The user assigns stakeholders (other users) who are then authorized to view the newly designed scenario and input
their preferences to the system.
5) The stakeholder who is making pair-wise judgments is at their conclusion able to view the resulting priorities and
may opt to repeat the process if s/he disagrees with the result; otherwise the preference details are recorded to
permanent storage.
6) The scenario creator views aggregate judgments and can examine judgment sensitivity by temporarily altering
stakeholder weights.
7) The scenario creator completes the scenario, opening the aggregate results to all stakeholders.
8) Stakeholders view the final choice and vote on the final outcome.  This information is permanently recorded.
CASE STUDY
One of the major criticisms of traditional risk-management based decision analysis is that it offers little insight into how the
different factors of a security infrastructure might interact with regard to the type and quality of response which is offered
given the presence of a threat.  In other words, it leaves us unable to see, for example, what kinds of trade-offs are implied
between various controls.  A security investment decision may greatly depend upon the preference among these criteria in
lieu of, or in addition to, financial considerations.  The ability to discern such a preference, taking into account something of
the specific nature of the controls that are being considered, could be very valuable if integrated into the selection process, as
the present system attempts to do.
The scenario shows how a qualitative multi-criteria approach can address this basic problem, in addition to demonstrating the
system in action.  In this scenario, a small-medium enterprise (SME) is facing resource allocation decisions and wishes to put
a  security  control  into  place  but  is  unsure  of  its  best  option.   They  know  roughly  that  they  would  prefer  a  preventative
solution and that they are willing to spend a reasonable amount of money if required.  Three stakeholders will be involved in
the decision.  In this case study, we follow through the general process outlined above with the creation, design, preference
collection, aggregation and voting, and recall of a sample scenario.  A user logs into the system and references the knowledge
base (step not shown, but see Figure 8).  The user determines that appropriate elements are available for the scenario, but
finds no scenarios that are an appropriate basis to derive the current scenario from.  The user then enters the scenario editor
(Figure 4).
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Figure 4.  ISSEC-DSS: Scenario editor
The scenario creator selects the type of scenario (alternatives are single elements) and chooses appropriate alternatives from
the  provided  list.   In  this  case,  our  user  chooses  three  controls:  “Snort”  (a  well-known  open  source  intrusion  detection
system), “Strong password policy”, and “Enterprise advanced firewall”.  The user decides that the scenario’s decision
hierarchy will consist of three criteria: “Detection”, “Prevention”, and “Purchase Cost”.
Having established the scenario and saved the structure, the user now assigns three users as decision stakeholders and then
opens the scenario to receive judgments.  These users now have permission to enter the scenario and input their preferences.
A user logs on to the system (Figure 5) and sees the newly assigned scenario in the active scenario listing, along with another
open scenario for threat evaluation, and one “Pending” work-in-progress by the user.
Figure 5.  ISSEC-DSS: Scenarios in progress, user view.
Selecting the scenario (“Prioritize security control implementation”), entering the scenario view, the user elects to run the
scenario and begins the pair-wise comparison process (which in this scenario will involve 12 comparisons).  As seen in
Figure 6, this user is strongly favoring “Prevention” over “Purchase Cost”.
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Figure 5.  ISSEC-DSS: Scenario preference gathering.
Our user completes the comparisons of criteria, and then ranks the alternatives against one another with respect to each
criterion (not shown).  Having completed these judgments, the user is able to view the resulting criteria preferences as well as
a prioritized ranking of alternatives (Figure 6).  Based on the preferences (favoring of “Prevention” ability [67.5%]
significantly above both “Purchase Cost”, a number which is obviously much higher for the firewall than either a policy
change or a free Open Source IDS solution, and “Detection” ability [6.54%]), the system recommends the firewall, despite
the fact that it is much more costly.
Figure 6.  ISSEC-DSS: Scenario results for an individual user.
The user agrees with the results (otherwise, the process can be repeated), and so opts to “Accept” the results, and the
hierarchy is persisted to the data warehouse.  At this point,  to show the aggregate, we assume that the other users follow a
similar process of judgment taking.  After this is accomplished, the scenario creator enters the Group results panel (Figure 7)
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Figure 7.  ISSEC-DSS: Scenario results for the group.
The final results from the ‘simple democracy’ weighting of stakeholders preferences end up fairly similar to those of our
individual user.  “Prevention” is highly favored (71.6%), which tips the scales in favor of the firewall solution.  It also
indicates to the decision-maker, however, two important facts: “Purchase Cost” remains an important consideration (21.2%)
and the interest in Detection solutions is quite negligible.  This console shows the scenario designer the status of this scenario
(all stakeholders have provided their judgments and none have voted on the outcome.  The scenario designer opts to
“publish” the results, which means that each group member can now view the aggregate total and vote on the outcome.
Figure 8.  ISSEC-DSS: Searchable knowledge base
Having completed the process, the archived results are now available through a searchable knowledge base (Figure 8) to form
the basis of new scenarios, or to support future managerial inquiries to gather situational knowledge in regard to various
assets, threats, and controls, and useful aggregates are available in the warehouse for future analysis.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
The traditional notion of information security, rooted in a solidly technical foundation, has within the past decade seen wide
criticism within academia - much of which has originated from the social sciences community - as being narrow and
technology-centric instead of holistic and organizational in its focus.  As information security awareness encompasses an
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ever-greater scope of organizational dynamics, it becomes necessary for us to develop design methodologies and ultimately,
systems, capable of dealing practically with the complex and multifaceted nature of the decision-making of information
systems security which is entailed by such emerging notions of a “new paradigm” for security, which can begin to address
the concerns of the socio-technical school.
Such conceptualizations must eventually be tested through experiment and application in real-world contexts if they are to
advance the state of security management.  To this end, we developed an initial prototype demonstrating the system
architecture, which implements a web-based multi-user DSS for scenario-based multi-criteria decision making.  Through the
case study, we can see the trade-offs in a decision fairly explicitly through this type of approach.  Even with our simplified
example, priorities become apparent, which affect the final decision outcome based on user preferences.  As a technique for
risk assessment, control selection and asset prioritization, this approach offers advantage over traditional techniques such as
expected value or annualized loss expectancy, if the decision entails prioritization on the basis of qualitative criteria, such as
capabilities or properties/attributes of the alternatives in the selection decision.  The ability to represent these criteria offers
advantage over checklist-based and matrix-based approaches and can deal with conflicting priorities.  It can be a valid
approach in combination with quantitative techniques, used to weight the relative importance of quantitative data relative to
other criteria.
Recommendations for future research
We have presented a deliberately idealized framework that implements a socio-technical design approach to security
decision-making through MCDM.  Obviously there are opportunities to utilize more sophisticated methods of aggregation
and variations on AHP and other multiple criteria approaches known in the literature, than we implemented in the prototype
system demonstrated here.  Exploration of the application of some of these techniques is expected.  The initial results are
encouraging, but more extensive field application of the system is necessary.
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